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Abstract
In this paper, I examine a number of commonly cited negative effects of high or rising levels of 
income inequality. I look at some of the literature in order to assess the statistical and empirical 
evidence in favor of  or against the presence and/or strength of those negative effects. Given the 
prevalence of  the topic of  income inequality in contemporary political, economic and social dis-
course, it's important to have a good understanding of  the effects of income inequality and to be 
able to identify effects that are or are not supported by strong statistical evidence. Such an un-
derstanding will also help to improve policies intended to diminish income inequality or to miti-
gate its effects (such as, for example, progressive taxation or education subsidies).
Given the size of  the literature, this overview  is far from complete. However, it does manage to 
identify certain negative effects which have a strong factual basis and which vindicate some of 
the often strongly expressed concerns about income inequality. At the same time, however, the 
paper identifies other commonly cited effects for which there is no strong evidence or for which 
the evidence is contradictory.
I focus on measurable harms resulting from income inequality and leave aside possible objec-
tions of  a moral or philosophical nature (such as concerns about justice), although I do mention 
the latter briefly. It may very well be possible that objections of  this nature are sufficient reasons 
for opposing inequality, even in the absence of  measurable harms. I don’t express a view  on 
that possibility and content myself  with the observation that the measurable harms are the suffi-
cient reasons.
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tion
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Although there are different ways to measure income inequality, the Gini Coefficient is the most 
common one.1 According to a recent OECD publication,2 income inequality according to the Gini 
Coefficient has increased in most developed countries over the last decades:
The causes of increasing income inequality are probably numerous. Technological changes, 
globalization, lower levels of unionization, tax policies and companies' salary and compensation 
policies are often cited. However, the effects rather than the causes of income inequality con-
cern us here. Let’s look at a number of commonly cited negative effects of high or rising levels 
of income inequality and examines the literature in order to assess the statistical and empirical 
evidence in favor of  or against the presence and/or strength of those negative effects. Given the 
prevalence of  the topic of  income inequality in contemporary political, economic and social dis-
cussions, it's important to have a good understanding of the effects of income inequality and to 
be able to identify effects that are or are not supported by strong statistical evidence. Such an 
understanding will also help to improve policies intended to diminish income inequality or to 
mitigate its effects (such as, for example, progressive taxation or education subsidies).
Before we examine the supposedly negative effects of income inequality, I should mention that 
income inequality also has positive outcomes. Some degree of inequality in some areas is often 
viewed as a necessary incentive to do well and be productive. Many talented people are moti-
1 For the calculation method of the Gini coefficient, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient. Other 
measures are: the proportion of a population with income less than 50% of the median income; ratio of 
average income for the 10% of the population with the lowest income to the average income for the 10% 
of the population with the highest income; average incomes of 10th and 90th percentile as percentage of 
median income; the Palma Ratio (see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Income_inequality_metrics#Palma_ratio), etc.
2 "Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising", OECD paper, December 2011, 
http://www.oecd.org/els/social/inequality 
vated by money rather than status, recognition, pleasure or other effects of  their activities. Ulti-
mately, the presence of monetary incentives for the more productive among us also benefits the 
worst off as they can join in the gains from increased production (such as higher employment 
levels, more consumer choice etc.). Some level of  inequality is then necessary for higher wel-
fare at the bottom of the income distribution.
The incentive argument in favor of income inequality has some plausibility and should therefore 
be taken into account when assessing both the more negative consequences of income ine-
quality and the policies aimed at remedying those negative consequences: anti-inequality poli-
cies may remedy some of inequality's negative effects but may also undo some of  the benefits 
of inequality. In casu, they may remove the incentive effect of inequality, which in turn may lead 
to economic harm even for those sections of  the population that supposedly suffer from the 
negative effects of inequality. The harm resulting from negative effects of  inequality may not al-
ways outweigh the harm done by policies that attempt to reduce inequality, since those policies 
may also reduce the positive effects of inequality.
However, the merits of the incentive argument are often overstated and limited at best. Incen-
tives do not justify inequality across the board, only specific types of inequality that have a de-
monstrable incentive effect and only when the benefits of  the incentives are not drowned by the 
harms of other effects of inequality. For instance, certain productive activities or certain produc-
ers may not respond positively to monetary incentives. People do things for different reasons, 
and money doesn't always count that much. Other people may be incentivized to work harder in 
order to make up for the money that is redistributed away from them by governments trying to 
reduce inequality. If  that is a common enough attitude, the productivity losses of removing the 
incentive effect are limited. In addition, some people earn a lot in morally blameworthy ways. 
Restrictions on redistribution for the sake of incentives will only incentivize immorality in cases 
such as these. 
The limited truth of the incentive theory is obvious from this graph3:
3 Taken from: http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-goals2013.pdf
The fact remains, however, that some instances of inequality are justified by the incentive argu-
ment: less inequality means less incentives, and fewer incentives can make the worst off even 
worse off. This basic tenet of  economic theory4 should be kept in mind when assessing the best 
policy reactions to certain harmful consequences of income inequality.
Apart from the incentive argument, one can also make a case in favor of inequality that is in-
spired not by economic effects but by moral concerns. Some people perhaps deserve their 
higher incomes because they invest greater efforts in morally praiseworthy undertakings that 
happen to yield high returns for an investment of effort. Indeed, people may have different in-
comes simply because they have different levels of  human capital and productive abilities. 
Some earn more because they contribute more – to their employers but also to society. They 
deserve, in a moral sense of the word, their higher incomes because of the level and nature of 
their contributions. Increasing differences in income levels are then the reflection of an increas-
ing gap in productivity and human capital between some groups in society. Efforts to remedy 
4 See par. I.2.2. of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith: "It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regard to their own interest".
some of the harmful consequences of inequality that go beyond investments in human capital 
should take into account the moral value of inequality. Some balancing of values is necessary 
and it would be immoral, according to this argument, to focus exclusively on remedying effects 
of inequality without taking into account the moral value of inequality.
However, just as in the case of  the incentive argument, the desert argument in favor of inequal-
ity is often overstated. As already mentioned above, inequality is not, in many cases, the result 
of effort and desert in the pursuit of morally praiseworthy goals but instead the outcome of luck, 
market failure, market manipulation, asymmetric information or other morally neutral or morally 
dubious causes or goals.
Hence, if  we agree that arguments in favor of inequality are at best of limited use, then we can 
focus on the arguments against. The latter mirror the structure of  the former: either they identify 
economic or social effects of  inequality – negative effects in this case - or they are focused more 
on moral concerns related to issues of justice. I will leave the philosophy for another occasion. 
First off, it's often assumed that income inequality has a detrimental effect on economic 
growth. Theoretically, high inequality reduces overall consumption because the wealthy con-
sume a smaller share of their income than the poor, and many people at the bottom of  the une-
qual distribution may reduce their work effort if they sense that society in unfair to them.
However, the classic causal story is different. Following Simon Kuznets, many economists be-
lieve that growth determines inequality rather than the other way around: first growth drives ine-
quality up, and then it gradually reduces it.
[T]here’s an inverted U-shaped relationship over long periods of economic development. 
As emerging economies grow  they initially become less equal as the few  with high finan-
cial endowments profit off of  their ownership of key productive resources, like land. 
Then, as industrialization evolves, much more of  the population has the chance to par-
ticipate in higher value-added work which reduces inequality. Jared Bernstein5 
This Kuznetsian view  has come under fire recently. Thomas Piketty for instance, in his “Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century“, has criticized Kuznets’ view  that inequality will eventually stabilize 
and subside on its own given increasing growth. According to Piketty, increasing wealth concen-
tration is a likely outcome for the foreseeable future. Kuznets findings were based on a historical 




So maybe the causal link does indeed go the other way. Different levels of income inequality will 
then influence growth7. For example, here’s a study8 arguing that high income inequality is likely 
to inhibit growth, especially in developing countries:




The likely reason for this effect:
high income inequality can discourage the evolution of  the economic and political institu-
tions associated with accountable government (which in turn enable a market environ-
ment conducive to investment and growth); and … high income inequality can under-
mine the civic and social life that sustains effective collective decision-making, especially 
in multi-ethnic settings. Nancy Birdsall9
Another study10 comes to a similar conclusion. It argues that, in general, more inequality endan-
gers the sustainability of  growth. Long consistent spells of economic growth are correlated with 
low levels of income inequality:
9 http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/13505
10 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Berg.htm
A growth spell in this graph is a period of  at least five years that begins with an unusual increase 
in the growth rate and ends with an unusual drop in growth.
It may seem counterintuitive that inequality is strongly associated with less sustained 
growth. After all, some inequality is essential to the effective functioning of a market 
economy and the incentives needed for investment and growth … But too much inequal-
ity might be destructive to growth. Beyond the risk that inequality may amplify the poten-
tial for financial crisis, it may also bring political instability, which can discourage invest-
ment. Inequality may make it harder for governments to make difficult but necessary 
choices in the face of shocks, such as raising taxes or cutting public spending to avoid a 
debt crisis. Or inequality may reflect poor people’s lack of access to financial services, 
which gives them fewer opportunities to invest in education and entrepreneurial activity. 
… [S]ocieties with more equal income distributions have more durable growth. … [A] 10 
percentile decrease in inequality (represented by a change in the Gini coefficient from 40 
to 37) increases the expected length of  a growth spell by 50 percent. Andrew  G. Berg 
and Jonathan D. Ostry11
Some additional support12 for this view: redistributive policies – which are anti-inequality policies 
– don’t actually harm growth:
11 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Berg.htm
12 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf
Redistribution doesn’t help growth either, according to this graph, but maybe it counteracts the 
negative effect of  inequality on growth given that it counteracts inequality. In that sense, it does 
help.
Let’s now  turn to another possible effect of high inequality. Some13  have hypothesized that 
there's a link between inequality and poverty. For example, where the income gap between the 
middle class and the poor is low, the former may feel more solidarity with the latter and may be 
more willing to fund a generous system of  social security, lifting up the incomes of the latter. And 
indeed, we see that poverty rates are higher in more unequal societies:
Does that mean that high income inequality leads to more poverty? Not necessarily. This would 
probably be the case if  we saw  that a country's poverty rate grows with increasing inequality, but 
that doesn't happen. Higher incomes for the poor result mainly from government transfers, and 
these do not mechanically decrease or increase with rising or diminishing inequality, contrary to 
the stated hypothesis.
If we look across the rich nations, it turns out that there is no relationship between 
changes in income inequality and changes in the absolute incomes of low-end house-
holds. The reason is that income growth for poor households has come almost entirely 
via increases in net government transfers, and the degree to which governments have 
increased transfers seems to have been unaffected by changes in income inequality. …
13 "The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution", Noam Lupu and Jonas Pontussen, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 2, May 2011, 
http://neighborhoodpartnerships.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/S3_structure_inequality.pdf
In some countries with little or no rise in income inequality, such as Sweden, government 
transfers increased and so did the incomes of  poor households. In others, such as Ger-
many, transfers and the incomes of low-end households did not increase.
Among nations with sharp increases in top-heavy inequality, we observe a similar dis-
junction. Here the U.S. and the U.K. offer an especially revealing contrast. The top 1%’s 
income share soared in both countries, and through the mid-1990s poor households 
made little progress … But over the next decade low-end American households ad-
vanced only slightly, whereas their British counterparts experienced sizable gains [result-
ing from the redistributive policies of the Labour government, FS]. Lane Kenworthy14
So, in other words, there are countries with soaring inequality that still manage to make the poor 
better off in absolute terms (not in relative terms obviously) through redistribution. Other coun-
tries that witness the same evolution of inequality don’t make their poor better off. Hence, the 
view  that inequality exacerbates poverty – perhaps through some form of loss of  solidarity be-
tween middle and lower classes, a loss that translates into diminished support for redistributive 
policies – doesn’t seem correct.
Another commonly cited effect of  inequality is the hollowing out of democracy. Democracy is 
based on the ideal of  the equal influence of  every citizen, but income inequality can give wealth-
ier citizens a greater ability to influence. And, indeed, the data show  that politics is more respon-
sive to the interests of the rich than to the interests of the poor:
14 http://lanekenworthy.net/2010/12/14/has-rising-inequality-been-bad-for-the-poor/
In almost every instance, [US] senators appear to be considerably more responsive to 
the opinions of affluent constituents than to the opinions of middle-class constituents, 
while the opinions of constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution have no 
apparent statistical effect on their senators’ roll call votes. Disparities in representation 
are especially pronounced for Republican senators, who were more than twice as re-
sponsive as Democratic senators to the ideological views of affluent constituents. Larry 
Bartels15
"Responsiveness" can mean that the wealthy are able to influence the tax code in a way that 
reduces its redistributive nature, that they can modify regulations inhibiting their power of wealth 
creation etc. If we cherish democracy, we should implement policies that limit the risk of selfish 
interventions by disproportionately influential individuals or groups, as well as policies that en-
15 "Economic Inequality and Political Representation", Larry M. Bartels, August 2005,
http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/economic.pdf
courage participation of relatively less influential individuals and groups. Reducing income ine-
quality is one possible policy, although one could also, for example, try to limit the effect of 
wealth on policy by way of campaign finance restrictions.
Income inequality may also lead to social fragmentation, with negative consequences for the 
cohesiveness of a society.
Community and equality are mutually reinforcing… Social capital and economic inequal-
ity moved in tandem through most of the twentieth century. In terms of the distribution of 
wealth and income, America in the 1950s and 1960s was more egalitarian than it had 
been in more than a century… [T]hose same decades were also the high point of social 
connectedness and civic engagement. Record highs in equality and social capital coin-
cided. Conversely, the last third of the twentieth century was a time of growing inequality 
and eroding social capital… The timing of  the two trends is striking: somewhere around 
1965-70 America reversed course and started becoming both less just economically and 
less well connected socially and politically. Robert Putnam16
If some groups sense that society in unfair to them, then fragmentation can result in instability 
and even violence. Very high levels of inequality may be socially and politically disruptive, espe-
cially when people believe – correctly or not – that many have earned their high income in un-
just ways or in ways that are not based on effort and talent.
The fragmentation problem surfaces in the data about social trust. People trust each other less 
in unequal societies17:
16 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000, p. 358. Graph is from 
http://www.bowlingalone.com/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gini_vs_social_capital_in_USA.jpeg
17 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level, Penguin Books, 2010
Inequality can also lead to financial instability and economic crises. Some18  have argued 
that inequality was one of the causes of  the recession of 2008/9. Unequal incomes during the 
decades leading up to the recession led to high savings rates among high-income individuals 
and high borrowing rates among low-income individuals, especially in the US. Financial institu-
tions and regulators encouraged this process, creating a dangerous credit and housing bubble, 
which eventually burst. Middle class and poor people were in fact deluded or deluded them-
selves into thinking that they were more affluent than they were.
[The bubble] disguised the impact of the enormous inequalities that were emerging. This 
extraordinary financial system that the connivances of successive American administra-
tions and Congresses developed, which overtly compensated for the weakness of the 
American social safety net and the emergence of this inequality, made people happier to 
live with a raw social deal. Will Hutton19
However, the causes of the 2008/9 recession are probably somewhat more complicated than 
that. Inequality may not have been the most important element.
18 Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines, Princeton University Press, 2010
19 http://fivebooks.com/interviews/will-hutton-on-fairness-and-inequality?print=
High inequality is correlated with low  social mobility. The data20 show  that highly inegalitarian 
societies, such as the U.S., are also societies with relatively low  levels of  social mobility. One 
could argue that income inequality isn't problematic when everyone has the same chance to be 
on the good side of  the inequality, given equal investment of  effort. But when inequality is com-
bined with social rigidity and stratification, it undermines meritocracy and equality of opportunity. 
To the extent that mobility is good, lower inequality is good as well.
The “intergenerational earnings elasticity” in this graph is a measure of  correlation between the 
income of  grown children and their parents, or – in other words – how  much a rise in your fa-
ther’s income affects your expected income; higher values suggest less mobility, 0 means that 
the kids of rich people earn as much as the kids of the poor.
What is the mechanism here? In part, high levels of income inequality make social mobility more 
difficult: when income inequality is relatively high, people at the wrong end of  inequality can offer 
comparatively less opportunities to their children than the people at the right end – less quality 
schooling, less quality healthcare etc. The children of  wealthy parents have more advantages 
compared to poor children then they would have in a less unequal society, and they are there-
fore more likely to end up in a high income group as adults. I assume that social mobility is a 
good thing and that people’s income should not be determined by the income of their parents.
20 "Do Poor Children Become Poor Adults? Lessons from a Cross Country Comparison of Generational 
Earnings Mobility", Miles Corak, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Discussion Paper Series, IZA 
DP No. 1993, http://ftp.iza.org/dp1993.pdf
There’s a series of  other potential outcomes of  income inequality for which the evidence is 
inconclusive. Income inequality may lead to health and family problems because of increased 
status competition and the stress that follows. If there’s an effect like this, it’s probably very 
small.21  Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett have stressed these effects, but the correlations 
they found were often weak and influenced by outliers.
It’s tempting to conclude that high inequality must result in higher levels of  unhappiness since 
people tend to assess their wellbeing relative to others. However, the data on this is sketchy at 
best:
There is no evidence that equality is related to happiness. Indeed, the proponents of 
greater income equality admit that they are unable to cite such evidence and instead rely 
on very unsatisfactory forms of indirect inference. The clearest determinants of wellbeing 
would seem to be employment, marriage, religious belief and avoiding poverty. None of 
these is obviously correlated with income equality.22
Another problem that may result from higher income inequality is educational attainment: when 
there are more rich people who are, in addition, increasingly rich, then they may be able to bid 
up the price of  tuition, making school unaffordable for middle and low  class individuals. How-
ever, according to some data23 this claim looks rather weak given the fact that increasing ine-




And yet, looking at dropout rates, there is a clear correlation24, at least in the US:
24 Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level, Penguin Books, 2010
To round up: income inequality does seem to produce a series of negative social consequences, 
although not always in the areas where we tend to assume that it does. Policy proposals to re-
duce income inequality are therefore partially vindicated. However, given the nature of those 
consequences as well as the obvious benefits of some forms of inequality, policy proposals 
should focus not on an across-the-board reduction of inequality but on detailed remedies of 
specific harmful consequences of inequality.
